About

Łódź Philosophical Workshop is a series of academic conferences organized by the IDEA Scientific Circle of Philosophers and Occidentalists and, like other activities of this circle, aims at popularizing issues related to humanities (broadly understood). Its fifth edition concerned contemporary problems of aesthetics, virtual reality and gender studies. The sixth edition was devoted to considerations on practical ethics, the seventh – to problematic nature of thinking. The eighth was entitled ‘East-West. Question about Philosophy and Its Roots’. The last edition, which took place in December 2018, had a title ‘Humanism-Posthumanism’.

Thus, it can be seen that the entire undertaking concerns current and important social and scientific issues. We would like to continue this tradition and, in relation to the current problem of the status of philosophy, humanities and thinking as such, establish a dialogue not only with philosophers, but also representatives of exact sciences and artists.

We strongly encourage anyone involved in philosophy, anthropology, ethnology, sociology, psychology, law, history and those who do not fit in any of these disciplines to participate in the Workshop. We guarantee a warm welcome and interesting discussion.


10TH ŁÓDŹ PHILOSOPHICAL WORKSHOP. SENSE-NONSENSE

Sense and nonsense seem to be terms that perfectly reflect the opposition between what is real, understandable, valuable and what is not. A sentence that makes sense can convince us, a sensible decision wins our approval. However, what conditions can be defined for the use of these concepts, what are the conditions for making sense, being sensible?

The categories of ‘sense’ and ‘nonsense’ have accompanied philosophical thought since its beginning. They were inalienable for ancient Greeks and although it is difficult to find terms that fully correspond to ‘sense’ and ‘nonsense’ in ancient Greek, both of these concepts were commonly used in literature and philosophy of the classical period. Both sense and its opposite were treated equally. It is difficult to conclude that philosophy, at its sources, was only looking for sense and fighting against its lack.

The problem of something having sense or not is also present in analytical philosophy, where it refers primarily to language and its elements. The sense of an utterance makes it understandable and is identical with having a logical value. Therefore it is a particularly desirable property for logic and methodology of science. What criteria, however, should be used to say that a statement has sense? Does it depend only on the correct application of grammar rules and semantic categories of a language? What status do paradoxes and absurdities have, and can we fully understand them? Does the impossibility of presenting a problem in a ‘having sense’ form imply that this is a fictitious problem, and exclude it from the area of philosophy and academic research?

The problem of sense and nonsense also has an undoubtful connection with a sphere of praxis and issues of values. This connection can be at least twofold. First, we can ask if sentences used to express value judgments make sense or are just nonsense. Secondly, we can ask why some practical problems make sense, someone’s actions are sensible or why one’s whole life makes sense, in other words, why they have value.

In philosophy, for some time now, we may talk of a phenomenon that can be called as ‘sense dispersal’. This situation can appear to us as both an opportunity and a threat. It is an opportunity, because it will release us from invalid judgments and provide us with a better view of reality around us leaving more space for efficient action. It is a threat, because a removal of a uniform basis, a source sense, can lead to excessive freedom and impossibility to set any criteria for thinking and acting. Contemporary philosophical reflection faces both this opportunity and this threat.